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[Crlm. No. 5423. In Bank. Aug. 14, 1953.J 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ARTHUR CISTO CARNINE, 
Appellant. 
[1] Homicide - Evidence. - Evidence that defendant entered a 
clothing store, struck proprietor on head causing him to fall 
to floor, dragged him to a washroom toward rear of building, 
took money from his wallet, packed a suitcase with clothing 
from store, left store in victim's car, and that two days later 
victim's body was discovered in washroom with a leather thong 
tied around his neck and several small puncture wounds in 
upper part of his body, death having been caused by shock 
and hemorrhage, is sufficient to support a finding that de-
fendant committed the homicide in perpetration of robbery or 
burglary and that he is therefore guilty of first degree murder. 
(Pen. Code, § 189.) 
[2] ld.-Murder-Killing in Perpetration of Robbery.-A killing 
is not first degree murder in perpetration of robbery, notwith-
(2] See Cal.Jur., Homicide, § 17. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, § 145(5); [2] Homicide, 
§15(6); [3J Homicide, §27C; [4] Criminnl Law, §1311; [5] Crim-
inal Law, § 733; [6J Homicide, § 270; [7J Homicide, §l4li [8] 
Homicide, § l~ .. 
) 
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standing killer takes money from victim's wallet after striking 
the fatnl blows, if thought of tnking money occnrs to him only 
after the attack has terminated. 
[8] Id.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Instructions.-
Error in failing to instruct jury in homicide ease that the 
killing was not in perpetration of or an attempt to perpetrate 
robbery if defendant had not formed intent to rob victim until 
after fatal blows were struck and he left victim's body lying 
on floor of a washroom is not curad by general instructions 
with reference to what constitutes first degree murder and 
robbery "'here these instructions do not set forth defendant's 
only available defense, aside from insanity, which is embodied 
in refused instruction. 
[4] Criminal Law-Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact.-Supreme 
Court on appeal cannot weigh the evidence to determi~e 
whether defendant's testimony was true or false. 
[5] Id.-Instructions-Applicability to i·heories.-It is duty of 
court to instruct on every theory of case finding support in 
the evidence. 
[6a,6b] Homicide-Appea.l-Harmless and Reversible Error-In-
structions.-Error in failing to instruct jury in homicide case 
that the killing was not in perpetration of or an attempt to 
perpetrate robbery if defendant had not formed intent to rob 
victim until after fatal blows were struck constitutes a mis-
carriage of justice within meaning of Con st., art. VI, § 4¥l, 
and a conviction of first degree murdel will be reversed, where 
evidence is not inconsistent with defendant's testimony that 
his attack on deceased was result of a sudden quarrel and that 
taking of propel'ty was an afterthought, where defendant made 
no appreciable effort to conceal his crime, which had few, if 
any, of the indicia of careful planning, where instructions on 
second degree murder carefully pointed out that murder could 
not be of second degree if it was committed in perpetration 
of a robbery or burglary, and where Supreme Court cannot 
say that a different verdict would have been improbable had 
requested instruction been given. 
[7] Id.-Burden..of Proof .-Burden of proof is' on prosecution in 
a homicide case to prove defendant guilty of first degree mur-
der beyond a reasonable doubt; it is not incumbent on de-
fendant to convince jury that his versioD of what occurred is 
true. 
[8] Id.-Evidenee.-Defendant in a homicide case is entitled to be 
found guilty of no more than murder of second degree if his 
testimony, viewed in light of other evidence, is sumcientto 
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APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239 
(b)) from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sonoma 
County. Donald Geary, Judge. Reversed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing 
the death penalty reversed. 
Paul Golis and Maurice Fredericks, under appointment by 
the Supreme Court, for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier, 
Deputy Attorney General, Joseph Maddux, District Attorney 
(Sonoma), and William G. Luckhardt, Deputy District At-
torney, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-This appeal is from a judgment imposing 
the death penalty following defendant's conviction of mst 
degree murder. 
The following facts are undisput.ed: On September 9, 1952, 
defendant came to Santa Rosa from his mother's and step-
father's home a short distance out of town. He arrived before 
noon and spent most of the afternoon in the Lido Bar drinking 
beer and talking to the bartender and other patrons. About 
5 p.m. he left the bar and went to Mr. Rosenbaum's near-by 
clothing store. He observed a salesman with a sample case 
talking to Mr. Rosenbaum and did not enter. He walked 
round the block, returned to the Lido Bar, and about 15 
minutes later returned to Mr. Rosenbaum's store. Mr. Rosen-
baum was then alone, reading a newspaper. Defendant entered 
the store, and after conversing with Mr. Rosenbaum, struck 
him twice on the side of the face and head. Mr. Rosenbaum 
fell to the floor, and defendant dragged him into a washroom 
toward the rear of the building. Defendant took money from 
his wallet, packed a suitcase with clothing from the store, and 
took it with him when he left the scene in Mr. Rosenbaum's 
car. He waited on one or two customers before he left the 
premises. Two days later Mr. Rosenbaum's body was dis-
covered in the washroom. There was a leather thong tied 
around his neck and several small puncture wounds in the 
upper part of his body. Death was caused by shock and hem-
orrhage owing to laceration of the face and scalp and con-
gestion and edema of the lungs owing to strangulation. After 
leaving the store, defendant drove to his parents' home and 
then to a ranch where he had been employed. Later he re-
turned to Santa Rosa, where he left Mr. Rosenbaum's car. 
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On the evening of the 11th, the same day Mr. Rosenbaum's 
body was found, he took a bus to San Francisco where' he was 
apprehended. 
Defendant pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of 
insanity. He testified that he went to the store to buy work 
clothes. Mr. RO'fmbaum was a friend of his and had lent him 
$25, which defendant had not repaid. . After he had bought 
the clothes he had an argument with Mr. Rosenbaum about 
the loan. He struck Mr. Rosenbaum twice but did not intend 
to kill him. He did not remember dragging him into the wash-
room or tying the thong round his neck or stabbing him. It 
was not until after he had left Mr. Rosenbaum in the wash-
room and had started to leave the store that he decided to 
return and take the money, clothing, and the car. 
Although there is no dispute that defendant had been drink-
ing before he attacked Mr. Rosenbaum, witnesses who saw 
him both shortly before and after the crime testified that he 
was not intoxicated. He remembered and described. most of 
the events that occurred at the time. In a <:tatement made to 
the district attorney and the police the day a fter his arrest, 
he said that he had bought the work clothe~ from Mr. Rosen-
baum earlier in the day and not at the tlJllL of the attack. 
In that statement he made no reference to t Quarrel about a 
loan. -
On the trial of the issue of not guilty by reason of insanity, 
four psychiatrists testified, one for the prosecution and three 
who had been appointed by the court. They wert' ,tIl of the 
opinion that defendant was legally sane at the th.e of the 
commission of the crime. Testifying in his own behalf, de-
fendant described some of his background and PI1:st experi-
ences. He stated that he knew it was wrong to kill except 
when in military service or in self-defense. None af the psy-
chiatrists were.... of the opinion that allythiJlg in defendant's 
testimony indicated legal insanity. No witness h:stified that 
defendant was legally insane. 
[lJ The foregoing evidence is sufficient to <:lpport a find-
ing that defendant committed the homicide i'l the perpetra-
tion of robbery or burglary, that lIe was : '. ~any sane at 
the time of the crime, and that he is t.heref"re guilty of mur-
der of the first degree. (Pen. Code, § 189.) l>efendant con-
tends, howeYer, that the trial court com:nitted prejudicial 
error by refusing to instruct the jury I)U his theory of the 
) 
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case. He offered the following instruction, which the trial 
court refused to give on the ground that it was not the law . 
.. If you find that Defendant ARTIlUR CARNINE had not 
formed an intention to rob !sroil Rosenbaum until after he 
struck Isroil Rosenbaum, dragged his body into the washroom, 
and left his body lying on the floor of the washroom;. then 
you ne instructed that !sroil Rosenbaum \vas not killed by 
ARTHUR CARNINE in the perpetration of or an attempt to per-
petrate, the crime of robbery." 
[2] According to defendant's testimony he never intpnded 
to killllfr. Rosenbaum and did not decide to take the property 
until after the attack had terminated. As stated in PeopZe 
v. Kerr, 37 Ca1.2d 11, 13-14 [229 P.2d 777], where the same 
defense was ad,·anced in a similar factual situation, "It is 
true that if defendant's thoughts followed the course described 
by him the killing would not be first degree murder in the 
perpetration of robbery. [Citations.] 71 Accordingly, the 
instruction should have been given. 
[8] It can not reasonably be contended that the error was 
cured by the following general instructions with respect to 
murder that were given by the court. 
"Murder which is committed in the perpetration or attempt 
to perpetrate the crime of robbery, is declared by law to be 
murder of the first degree, and if you should find, beyond a 
reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty, that the defendant, 
Arthur C.Carnine,killed Isroil Rosenbaum in the perpetra-
tion or attempt to perpetrate the crime of robbery, as those 
terms are defined herein, you will have no choice but to desig-
nate the offense as murder in the first degree. 
"Murder which is committed in the perpetration or attempt 
to perpetrate the crime of burglary, is declared by law to be 
murder of the first degree, and if you should find, beyond 
a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty, that the defend-
ant, Arthur C. Carnine, killed !sroil Rosenbaum in the per-
petration or attempt to perpetrate the crime of burglary, as 
those terms are defined herein, you will have no choice but 
to designate the offense as murder in the first degree. 
"Robbery is defined by Sectioll 211 of the Penal Code as 
follows: 'Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property 
in the possession of another, from his person. or immediate 
presence, and against his will, accomplisbed by means of force 
or fear.' 
l'In so far as this case is concerned, the crime of burglary 
is defined by section 459 of the Penal Code as follows: 'Every 
/ 
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person who enters any . , , store . , . or other building with 
intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony, is guilty 
of burglary.' 
"The word 'perpetration' as used in these instructions, is 
defined as the doing or performance or commission of an act 
consciously or with a guilty intent, to commit the offense or 
offenses charged as a wicked deed. 
"If you find that the defendant Arthur Carnine had not 
formed an intention to burglarize !sroil R{)senbaum's store 
until after he struck lsroil Rosenbaum, dragged his body into 
the washroom and left his body lying on the floor of the wash-
room-if he did such acts, then you are instructed that !sroil 
Rosenbaum was not killed by Arthur Carnine in the perpetra-
tion of, or an attempt to perpetrate, the crime of burglary." 
There is nothing in the foregoing instructions that sets forth 
defendant's defense to the charge of murder committed in 
the perpetration of robbery. It is not improbable that the 
jury concluded that a lethal assault followed by a stealing 
of the victim's property constituted murder in the perpetra-
tion of a robbery even though the intent to steal was not con-
ceived until the assault had terminated. The instructions 
not only left the door open to such a conclusion, but by speci-
fically pointing out that in the case of murder committed in 
the perpetration of burglary the criminal intent must have 
been formed before defendant entered the store, they sug-
gested that the time at which defendant formed the intent 
to steal the property was irrelevant in the case of murder 
committed in the perpetration of robbery. 
Since defendant admitted that he had attacked 11r. Rosen-
baum and thereafter had stolen his property, his only avail-
able defense, aside from insanity, to the charge of murder 
of the first degree was that set forth in the refused instruc-
tion. Although the jury was not required to accept defend-
ant's testimony that he never intended to kill Mr. Rosenbaum 
and that he did not decide to steal his property until after 
the assault was completed (People v. Kerr, supra, 37 Ca1.2d 
11, 14), he was entitled to have them properly instructed 
on the defense raised thereby, (People v. Carmen, 36 Ca1.2d 
768, 772-774 [228 P.2d 281], and cases cited.) 
[4] This court cannot weigh the evidence to determine 
whether defendant's testimony was true or false. That ques-
tion was for the jury. Under the instructions given it is im-
possible to conclude from the verdict that the jury disbe-
lieved him and accordingly found against his only available 
) 
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defense. [5J As stated in Daniels v. City & County of San 
Francisco, 40 CaI.2d 614, 623 [255 P.2d 785J, "It is the 
duty of the court to instruct on every theory of the case 
finding support in the evidence. [Citations. J The ordinary 
rules on appeal sustaining a general verdict which the evi-
dence on one of several issues upholds [citationsJ has no 
application here where plaintiffs' theory of recovery was not 
even presented to the jury as an issue affecting their right 
of recovery. [Citations.]" 
[6aJ Even if we were at liberty to weigh the evidence to 
determine what credence the jury might have given defend· 
ant's testimony had its relevance been pointed out to them, 
we could not say that the evidence preponderated against the 
-::ruth of his version of his mental processes. Defendant is 
21 years of age. His formal education ended with the 
sixth grade, although he had some further education dur-
ing the period of approximately two years he spent in the 
army after enlisting at the age of 16. After leaving the army 
he wandered about the country working for brief periods at 
various jobs. Several months before the crime he came to 
Santa Rosa to live with his mother and stepfather. He soon 
left Santa Rosa, however, and did not return until shortly 
before the crime. The day before the crime he secured em· 
ployment as a milker at a ranch. The following morning he 
borrowed $10 from his stepfather to buy work clothes and 
walked into town. He visited various bars and poolhalls 
looking for friends and bought a half pint of whiskey and 
drank it. About 2 :30 in the afternoon he went to the Lido 
Bar where he stayed until he left to go to Mr. Rosenbaum's 
store. While at the bar he drank from four to eight beers 
and one whiskey. He testified that Mr. R{)senbaum was a 
friend of his and that the reason he did not enter the store 
when he first went there was that he saw that Mr. Rosenbaum 
was busy and he did not wish to disturb him. He returned to 
the Lido Bar, had another beer, and then returned to Mr. 
Rosenbaum's store. After he had attacked Mr. Rosenbaum 
and left him lying in the washroom he waited on two cus-
tomers. He made no effort to hurry them out of the store, 
but urged one of them to buy something else after he was 
unable to find what the customer originally wanted. In addi. 
tion to the money he found in Mr. Rosenbaum's wallet, he 
took a suitcase and a box or boxes packed with clothing of 
assorted sizes. He then took Mr. Rosenbaum's car and drove 
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into a ditch and got other employees of the ranch to pull the 
car out. He unloaded the clothing and later drove back to 
town where he left the car. Later in the evening he took a 
taxi to various bars and then back to the ranch. During the 
evening he drank so much that the foreman was unable to 
awaken him for the morning milking, and he was fired. Later 
in the day he borrowed five dollars from his stepfather and 
went to the Russian river with his cousin where they canoed 
and drank whiskey. The following evening he decided to 
leave town and took a bus to San Francisco. He took some 
of the clothing he had stolen with him and left the rest at 
his mother's and stepfather's cabin. The testimony of various 
witnesses suggests that defendant had a rather easygoing, 
happy-go-lucky disposition. He owned a gun, but he did not 
use it in the commission of the crime. 
The foregoing evidence is not inconsistent with defendant's 
testimony that his attack on Mr. Rosenbaum was the result of 
a sudden quarrel and that the taking of the property was an 
afterthought. It is inconsistent with the theory of a planned 
robbery or burglary. Defendant did not enter a store where 
he was unknown or where he could expect to :find any large 
amount of money. He made no appreciable effort to conceal 
his crime. Not only did he expose himself to witnesses at the 
scene, but he drove his victim's car to the ranch where he 
worked and enlisted the aid of people who knew him to pull 
the car out of the ditch. Had he killed Mr. Rosenbaum to 
prevent his identification as a robber it is unlikely that 
immediately thereafter he would 'leave a trail so easily fol-
lowed. The evidence presents a picture of a crime committed 
by a person whose behavior was generally erratic and who at 
the time was at least partially under the influence of alcohol. 
The crime pad few, if any, of the indicia of careful planning. 
Under these circumstances it was a close question whether 
defendant first decided to rob Mr. Rosenbaum and then killed 
him in the perpetration of that robbery- 01' first attacked him 
without premeditation and only thereafter decided to steal 
his property. 
It can not be inferred from the fact that the jury brought 
in a verdict of murder of the first rather than of the second 
degree that it decided this question against defendant. The 
instructions on second degree murder carefully pointed out 
that murder could not be of the second degree if it was com-
mitted in the perpetration of a robbery or burglary. Thus 
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committed in the perpetration of a robbery or burglary, and 
as pointed out above, none of the latter instructions explained 
to the jury defendant's only defense to the charge of murder 
committed in the perpetration of a robbery. 
[7] In determining whether the error was prejudicial, 
it bears emphasis that the burden was on the prosecution to-
prove defendant guilty of murder of the first degree beyond 
a reasonable doubt. It was not incumbent upon defendant to 
convince the jury that his version of what occurred was true. 
[8] He was entitled to be found guilty of no more than 
murder of the second degree if his testimony viewed in the 
light of the other evidence was sufficient to create a reasonable 
doubt as to his guilt of murder of the first degree. [6b] Un-
der these circumstances we cannot say that a different verdict 
would have been improbable had the requested instruction 
been given. Accordingly, the error constituted a miscarriage 
of justice within the meaning of article VI, section 4% of the 
Constitution. (People v. Newson, 37 Ca1.2d 34, 45 [230 P.2d 
618]; People v. Hamilton, 33 Ca1.2d 45, 51 [198 P.2d 873].) 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, 
J., concurred. 
Edmonds, J., concurred in the judgment. 
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